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By	  the	  end	  of	  2014,	  Chinese	  outward	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (ODI)	  ranked	  fifth	  in	  the	  world,	  accounting	  for	  5.7	  percent	  of	  the	  global	  total,	  just	  ahead	  of	  Russia	  yet	  trailing	  Luxemburg,	  the	  U.S.,	  Japan	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  This	  level	  of	  investment	  placed	  China	  ahead	  of	  entire	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  Latin	  America,	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Independent	  States	  (CIS),	  Southeast	  Asia,	  and	  Africa.	  The	  rise	  of	  Chinese	  ODI	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  has	  indeed	  been	  rapid,	  is	  increasingly	  significant,	  and	  often	  perceived	  as	  linked	  to	  policy	  goals	  of	  the	  Chinese	  central	  government	  globally.	  	  However,	  growth	  to	  date	  reflects	  less	  a	  global	  scale	  surge	  into	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  markets,	  and	  more	  a	  continued	  commitment	  to	  investing	  the	  majority	  of	  capital	  domestically,	  albeit	  often	  through	  preferential	  foreign	  channels,	  and	  certainly	  supplemented	  by	  growth	  in	  genuine	  international	  investment.	  	  Much	  of	  China’s	  ODI	  has	  historically	  remained	  quite	  local,	  serving	  largely	  as	  a	  convenient	  channel	  to	  invest	  Chinese	  capital	  domestically.	  	  In	  2013,	  well	  over	  one-­‐half	  (58	  percent)	  of	  Chinese	  ODI	  was	  directed	  to	  Hong	  Kong,	  with	  another	  12	  percent	  to	  the	  British	  Virgin	  Islands	  and	  the	  Cayman	  Islands.1	  	  Chinese	  Academy	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  (CASS)	  scholars	  estimate	  that	  well	  over	  one-­‐third	  of	  China’s	  FDI	  consists	  of	  such	  round-­‐tripping,	  destined	  for	  the	  Chinese	  domestic	  market,	  with	  the	  remainder	  focused	  on	  securing	  stakes	  in	  large	  financial	  institutions.	  	  	  
From	  an	  industry	  level	  perspective,	  while	  energy	  imports	  and	  international	  energy	  stakes	  are	  growing	  from	  a	  small	  relative	  base,	  China’s	  energy	  system	  remains	  nearly	  85	  percent	  self-­‐sufficient.	  In	  this	  regard	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  CEIC	  China	  Premium	  Database.	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China	  remained	  a	  net	  energy	  exporter	  as	  recently	  as	  1997.	  	  From	  an	  institutional	  perspective,	  the	  capacity	  of	  domestic	  regulatory	  institutions	  seeking	  to	  inform	  international	  energy	  investments	  remains	  significantly	  limited.	  Moreover,	  from	  an	  elite	  politics	  perspective,	  the	  domestic	  orientation	  of	  Chinese	  senior	  leaders’	  political	  portfolios	  renders	  direct	  links	  between	  foreign	  policy	  interests	  and	  increasingly	  diverse	  energy	  investments	  tenuous	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases.	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  majority	  state	  ownership	  of	  key	  energy	  firms	  has	  undoubtedly	  continued	  to	  afford	  the	  Chinese	  central	  state	  certain	  rights	  of	  senior	  personnel	  appointment,	  the	  granting	  of	  access	  to	  capital	  at	  preferential	  rates	  from	  policy	  banks,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  utilize	  approval	  authority	  to	  pick	  industrial	  “winners”.	  	  However,	  state	  ownership	  has	  also	  created	  governance	  challenges	  that	  have	  periodically	  weakened	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  shape	  energy	  outcomes,	  and	  rendered	  some	  industries	  highly	  concentrated,	  others	  highly	  fragmented,	  and	  a	  regulatory	  capacity	  that	  remains	  splintered	  at	  best.	  	  
	  
An	  Enduring	  Focus	  on	  State	  Ownership	  State	  ownership	  looms	  large	  in	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  China’s	  ODI	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  shaping	  such	  investments.	  	  An	  oft-­‐cited	  observation	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  over	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Chinese	  ODI	  in	  2009	  was	  accounted	  for	  by	  central	  government	  owned	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs).2	  	  Even	  by	  2013,	  40	  percent	  of	  non-­‐financial	  ODI	  was	  invested	  by	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  strictly	  defined,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Nargiza	  Salidjanova,	  “Going	  Out:	  An	  Overview	  of	  China’s	  Outward	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment”,	  US-­‐China	  
Economic	  &	  Security	  Review	  Commission,	  March	  30,	  2011,	  p.	  6.	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limited	  liability	  corporations	  (LLCs)	  –	  most	  of	  which	  have	  significant	  state	  ownership	  at	  the	  central	  or	  local	  level	  –	  invested	  another	  38	  percent.3	  The	  dominance	  of	  central	  government	  SOEs	  in	  ODI	  flows	  seemingly	  contradicts	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  economic	  liberalization	  that	  has	  fueled	  rapid	  growth	  in	  China	  for	  several	  decades.	  As	  Margaret	  Pearson	  argues,	  China’s	  creation	  of	  formally	  independent	  regulatory	  agencies	  “in	  form,	  is	  consistent	  with,	  and	  informed	  by,	  key	  tenets	  of	  the	  global	  wave	  of	  regulatory	  reform:	  releasing	  some	  economic	  functions	  from	  direct	  government	  management;	  establishing	  regulators	  as	  market	  ‘referees’;	  and	  increasing	  the	  capacity	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  economic	  bureaucracy.”4	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	  formal	  regulatory	  institutions	  in	  China	  have,	  to	  some	  degree,	  modeled	  themselves	  after	  the	  idealized	  “regulatory	  state”,	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  has	  retained	  key	  aspects	  of	  direct	  corporate	  influence.	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  privileged	  access	  to	  state-­‐subsidized	  loans	  from	  policy	  banks	  such	  as	  the	  China	  Development	  Bank,	  the	  two	  most	  direct	  levers	  of	  influence	  are:	  i)	  personnel	  power	  through	  the	  appointment	  of	  senior	  SOE	  executives	  by	  the	  CCP	  Organization	  Department	  and	  the	  State	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  (SASAC);	  and	  ii)	  project	  approval	  power	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  medium-­‐to-­‐large	  size	  investment	  projects	  through	  the	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Commission	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  institutions.	  	  This	  concentration	  of	  influence	  is	  critical,	  and	  illustrates	  the	  longstanding	  importance	  to	  the	  central	  state	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  CEIC	  Database.	  
4	  Margaret	  Pearson,	  “Regulation	  and	  Regulatory	  Politics	  in	  China’s	  Tiered	  Economy,”	  Draft	  paper	  prepared	  
for	  conference	  on	  “Capitalism	  With	  Chinese	  Characteristics:	  China’s	  Political	  Economy	  in	  Comparative	  and	  
Theoretical	  Perspectives,	  Indiana	  University,	  May	  19-­‐20,	  2006,	  p.7.	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maintaining	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  corporate	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Central	  state	  ownership,	  and	  the	  formal	  right	  of	  personnel	  management	  that	  such	  ownership	  legitimates,	  greatly	  complements	  project	  approval	  and	  other	  regulatory	  rights	  that	  the	  central	  state	  has	  retained	  despite	  liberalization	  reforms.	  	  As	  Margaret	  Pearson	  again	  argues:	  “It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  it	  is	  not,	  as	  often	  characterized,	  bureaucratic	  inertia	  and	  vested	  interest	  that	  keeps	  the	  state-­‐owned	  sector	  alive.	  	  Rather,	  it	  reflects	  a	  conscious	  effort	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  to	  concentrate	  and	  consolidate	  this	  top	  tier	  as	  a	  key	  part	  of	  China’s	  development	  strategy.”5	  	  
Moreover,	  despite	  considerable	  liberalization,	  China’s	  energy	  industries	  historically	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  areas	  in	  which	  central	  state	  ownership	  and	  management	  should	  be	  “pushed”	  or	  “furthered”	  (tui	  jin)	  to	  ensure	  an	  absolute	  controlling	  (juedui	  kongzhi)	  shareholder	  stake.6	  	  This	  has	  not	  been	  the	  case	  historically	  in	  many	  other	  industries,	  as	  Barry	  Naughton	  and	  other	  scholars	  have	  well	  documented.7	  	  Even	  two	  years	  after	  the	  widely-­‐referenced	  and	  critical	  15th	  Party	  Congress	  Report,	  in	  which	  China’s	  President	  Jiang	  Zemin	  provided	  ideological	  rationalization	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  Communist	  Party	  and	  Party	  support	  of	  private	  capital,	  the	  Fourth	  Plenum	  made	  clear	  that	  “natural	  monopoly”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Ibid.,	  p.14.	  
6	  “China	  names	  key	  industries	  for	  absolute	  state	  control”	  China	  Daily,	  December	  19,	  2006.	  	  See	  also	  Dahe	  
Daily,	  “Qi	  da	  hangye	  bixu	  you	  guozi	  kongzhi,	  qi	  da	  hangye	  baokuo	  jungong,	  dianwang	  dianli,	  shiyou	  
shihua,	  dianxin,	  meitan,	  minhang,	  hangyun”	  December	  19,	  2006.	  
http://epaper.dahe.cn/dhb/htm2006/t20061219_774304.htm	  
7	  For	  useful	  treatment	  of	  the	  central	  state’s	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  state	  ownership	  in	  broader	  industries,	  see	  
Barry	  Naughton,	  “Selling	  Down	  the	  State	  Share:	  Contested	  Policy,	  New	  Rules”,	  China	  Leadership	  Monitor,	  
No.1,	  Part	  2,	  March	  2002.	  	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  drive	  to	  increase	  state	  shares	  in	  strategic	  sectors	  such	  as	  
energy,	   see	   Barry	   Naughton,	   “SASAC	   Rising”,	   China	   Leadership	  Monitor,	   No.14	   Spring	   2005;	   and	   Barry	  
Naughton	  “Top-­‐Down	  Control:	  SASAC	  and	  the	  Persistence	  of	  State	  Ownership	  in	  China”,	  draft	  conference	  
paper,	  June	  26,	  2006.	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industries	  such	  as	  energy	  and	  other	  “lifeline”	  industries	  required	  control	  through	  the	  state-­‐owned	  economy	  “guoyou	  jingji	  xuyao	  kongzhi”.8	  	  	  
Such	  special	  treatment	  has	  continued	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  Specifically,	  SASAC	  identified	  national	  defense,	  electric	  power,	  petroleum	  and	  petrochemical,	  telecommunications,	  coal,	  civil	  aviation,	  and	  shipping	  industries	  in	  2009	  and	  2010	  as	  requiring	  the	  strengthening	  of	  central	  state	  ownership	  and	  management.9	  	  These	  industries	  were	  first	  enumerated	  in	  a	  December	  5,	  2006	  SASAC	  promulgation	  entitled:	  “Guidelines	  and	  Opinions	  Regarding	  the	  Furthering	  of	  State-­‐owned	  Capital	  Adjustment	  and	  the	  Reorganization	  State-­‐owned	  Enterprises”.10	  
In	  the	  energy	  sector,	  this	  focus	  on	  strengthening	  state	  ownership	  has	  also	  perpetuated	  significant	  costs,	  largely	  through	  inefficiencies	  in	  rates	  of	  production,	  capital	  use,	  industrial	  structure,	  and	  levels	  of	  technological	  innovation.	  As	  is	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  paper,	  such	  inefficiency	  is	  most	  apparent	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  China’s	  oil	  and	  gas	  industries,	  whereby	  one	  company	  –	  CNPC	  –	  produces	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	  nation’s	  natural	  gas	  and	  nearly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  national	  crude	  oil.	  	  Government	  leaders	  such	  as	  former	  Premier	  Zhu	  Rongji	  appreciated	  the	  long	  term	  costs	  of	  China’s	  historical	  industrial	  organization,	  in	  which	  one	  firm	  performed	  onshore	  exploration	  and	  production	  of	  crude	  oil	  and	  gas,	  another	  firm	  refined	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  CCP	  Central	  Committee	  Circular,	  “Zhonggong	  zhongyang	  guanyu	  guoyou	  qiye	  gaige	  he	  fazhan	  ruogan	  
zhongda	  wenti	  de	  jueding”,	  Fourth	  Plenum	  of	  15th	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  Congress,	  September	  22,	  
1999,	  in	  SASAC,	  Zhongguo	  guoyou	  zichan	  jiandu	  guanli	  nianjian	  2007,	  (Beijing:	  Zhongguo	  Jingji	  
Chubanshe,	  2007).	  
9	  Kang	  Yi,	  Liu	  Weixun,	  “List	  of	  key	  Chinese	  subsidiaries	  ‘Not	  For	  Sale’	  being	  drafted”	  Economic	  Observer	  
(January	  19,	  2009).	  http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/Industry/2009/01/22/128015.shtml.	  
10	  “Guanyu	  tuijin	  guoyou	  ziben	  tiaozheng	  he	  guoyou	  qiye	  chongzu	  de	  zhidao	  yijian”.	  	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/gzjg/xcgz/200612180138.htm.	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feedstock	  into	  product	  such	  as	  diesel	  and	  naptha,	  and	  a	  third	  managed	  offshore	  exploration,	  production,	  and	  foreign	  joint	  ventures.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Zhu	  chose	  to	  enact	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  in	  1998	  to	  integrate	  vertically	  China’s	  three	  major	  oil	  and	  gas	  corporations	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  compete	  domestically,	  then	  internationally.	  	  The	  current	  dominance	  of	  CNPC	  in	  oil	  and	  gas	  exploration	  and	  production	  reflects	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  15-­‐year-­‐old	  reform	  remains	  very	  much	  incomplete.	  	  	  
A	  Turn	  to	  the	  Outside	  World,	  A	  Loosening	  of	  Regulatory	  Levers	  	  
While	  regulations	  relating	  to	  ownership	  of	  Chinese	  domestic	  energy	  assets	  are	  tightening,	  rules	  governing	  the	  growth	  of	  outward	  FDI	  have	  increasingly	  liberalized	  to	  allow	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  firms	  and	  regulators	  increased	  breadth	  in	  approval	  and	  to	  lower	  institutional	  barriers	  to	  capital	  outflow.	  This	  diversification	  of	  actors	  and	  decentralization	  of	  approval	  have	  supported	  increased	  volumes	  of	  investment	  abroad	  but	  have	  also	  weakened	  central	  state	  oversight	  over	  such	  investment.	  The	  State	  Council	  remains	  the	  highest	  state	  authority	  over	  outward	  investment,	  while	  four	  other	  institutions	  mediate	  the	  disposition	  of	  state	  assets,	  conversion	  of	  foreign	  exchange,	  as	  well	  as	  approval	  of	  projects	  and	  ventures	  abroad.	  SASAC	  governs	  the	  sale,	  merger,	  acquisition,	  and	  annual	  auditing	  of	  a	  select	  group	  of	  state	  assets	  at	  the	  central	  and	  local	  level.	  The	  commission	  also	  has	  input	  into	  personnel	  movements	  concerning	  individuals	  of	  vice-­‐ministerial	  rank	  and	  below.	  The	  State	  Administration	  of	  Foreign	  Exchange	  (SAFE)	  regulates	  the	  utilization	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  by	  issuing	  certification	  of	  funding	  sources	  and	  amounts.	  The	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Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  (MOFCOM)	  and	  the	  NDRC	  are	  most	  closely	  coordinated,	  as	  they	  use	  common	  standards	  and	  criteria	  to	  review	  proposed	  projects,	  partnerships,	  ventures,	  and	  mergers/acquisitions/sales.	  	  MOFCOM	  approves	  outward	  FDI	  projects	  by	  ensuring	  that	  administrative	  measures	  relating	  to	  SASAC,	  SAFE,	  and	  the	  NDRC	  are	  adhered	  to,	  by	  granting	  approving	  of	  each	  ODI	  proposals	  and	  by	  recording	  all	  relevant	  investment,	  destination,	  and	  financial	  information	  relevant	  to	  each	  project.	  	  The	  NDRC	  enjoys	  approval	  authority	  as	  well,	  but	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  alignment	  of	  the	  proposed	  project	  or	  investment	  with	  national	  industrial	  policy,	  and	  with	  the	  financial	  or	  industrial	  capacity	  of	  the	  proposed	  parties	  involved.	  Following	  the	  accession	  of	  China	  to	  the	  WTO,	  coordination	  between	  these	  institutions	  has	  understandably	  grown	  in	  complexity	  and	  volume.	  	  A	  series	  of	  reforms	  was	  enacted	  in	  recent	  years	  to	  simplify	  and	  to	  decentralize	  approvals	  to	  address	  the	  increased	  investment	  volume.	  	  By	  early	  2006	  SAFE	  had	  begun	  to	  allow	  local	  SAFE	  branches	  to	  approve	  investment	  projects	  of	  a	  value	  lower	  than	  $10	  million.	  	  Simultaneously,	  limits	  on	  the	  quantity	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  permitted	  for	  ODI	  investments	  were	  also	  removed.	  In	  December	  2008	  the	  China	  Banking	  Regulatory	  Commission	  authorized	  all	  commercial	  banks	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  loans	  for	  cross-­‐border	  M&A,	  thus	  removing	  another	  lever	  for	  central	  government	  control	  and	  a	  de	  facto	  monopoly	  on	  such	  loans.	  In	  2009	  MOFCOM,	  like	  SAFE,	  permitted	  local	  branches	  to	  approve	  investments,	  but	  raise	  the	  limit	  to	  $100	  million	  through	  Circular	  No.	  5.	  	  A	  “Fast	  Track”	  program	  to	  expedite	  approvals	  was	  also	  implemented	  by	  MOFCOM	  that	  reduced	  approval	  time	  for	  smaller	  projects	  to	  under	  three	  days.	  SASAC	  then	  codified	  this	  simplified	  raft	  of	  reforms	  through	  the	  publication	  of	  the	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“Interim	  Measures	  for	  the	  Administration	  of	  Overseas	  State-­‐Owned	  Assets	  of	  Central	  State-­‐Owned	  Enterprises,”	  effective	  July	  2011.	  
	  
A	  Splintered	  Bureaucracy	  Despite	  the	  proliferation	  of	  actors	  and	  loosening	  of	  regulations	  discussed	  above,	  the	  National	  Energy	  Commission	  attempts	  to	  oversee	  national	  implementation	  of	  energy	  policy	  with	  only	  nine	  departments	  and	  a	  staff	  size	  of	  approximately	  130	  people	  –	  double	  the	  50-­‐60	  staff	  of	  the	  original	  Energy	  Bureau,	  but	  still	  quite	  limited.11	  	  In	  all,	  China’s	  central	  government	  may	  contain	  approximately	  910	  individuals	  whose	  work	  in	  some	  way	  is	  related	  to	  energy	  policy.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Agency	  (EIA)	  alone	  –	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  mainly	  to	  data	  gathering,	  analysis,	  and	  education	  –	  employed	  620	  people	  in	  fiscal	  year	  2004.	  The	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy	  (DOE)	  employed	  14,713	  individuals	  in	  the	  same	  period.12	  	  The	  disparity	  in	  personnel	  is	  striking,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  decentralization,	  ownership	  diversification,	  corporatization,	  and	  rapid	  capacity	  expansion	  that	  characterize	  China’s	  current	  energy	  market.	  	  	  
When	  considering	  the	  link	  between	  Chinese	  energy	  investments	  and	  policy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  China’s	  energy	  regulatory	  entities	  have	  been,	  and	  continue	  to	  be,	  characterized	  by	  overlapping	  jurisdictions	  and	  waves	  of	  centralization	  and	  decentralization.	  Chinese	  energy	  governance	  has	  remained	  persistently	  fragmented.	  	  Analysis	  of	  four	  key	  centralization	  initiatives	  conveys	  the	  consistently	  splintered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  These	  departments	  include:	  General	  Integration,	  Strategic	  Planning,	  Policy,	  International	  Cooperation,	  
Science	  and	  Technology	  Energy	  Savings,	  New	  Energy,	  Coal,	  Electric	  Power,	  Petroleum	  and	  Natural	  Gas.	  	  
12	  Email	  communication	  with	  US	  EIA	  staff,	  December	  20,	  2005;	  US	  DOE	  website.	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nature	  of	  such	  governance	  domestically,	  and	  frames	  well	  the	  higher	  challenge	  of	  coordinating	  such	  governance	  with	  more	  diffuse	  foreign	  energy	  policy	  goals.13	  	  The	  2008	  creation	  of	  the	  National	  Energy	  Administration	  and	  the	  2010	  establishment	  of	  the	  National	  Energy	  Commission	  (headed	  by	  the	  Premier)	  are	  simply	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  centralization	  efforts,	  and	  precedent	  suggests	  that	  the	  lifetime	  of	  such	  institutions	  in	  China	  may	  be	  quite	  short.	  	  	  
	  
Repeated	  Attempts	  at	  Administrative	  Centralization	  (1953-­‐1982)	  Significantly,	  Beijing’s	  first	  attempt	  to	  centralize	  energy	  oversight	  proved	  short-­‐lived.	  Between	  1953	  and	  1955,	  the	  newly	  founded	  central	  government	  created	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Fossil	  Fuels	  (MFF)	  to	  combine	  the	  coal,	  electricity	  and	  petroleum	  industries	  into	  one	  entity	  for	  energy	  policymaking,	  allocation,	  planning	  and	  development.	  By	  1955	  the	  need	  for	  management	  specialization	  and	  heightened	  growth	  of	  energy	  demand	  from	  six	  percent	  to	  over	  15	  percent	  quickly	  led	  to	  the	  abolishment	  of	  the	  MFF	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  separate	  ministries	  for	  coal	  and	  petroleum.	  	  	   	  
A	  second	  administrative	  consolidation	  trend	  emerged	  in	  1960,	  when	  the	  disastrous	  results	  of	  the	  Great	  Leap	  Forward	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  advisers	  led	  to	  economic	  growth	  plummeting	  from	  slightly	  under	  nine	  percent	  the	  previous	  year	  to	  negative	  0.3	  percent.	  	  Coordination	  was	  strengthened	  among	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Electric	  Power	  (MOEP),	  Ministry	  of	  Coal	  Industry	  (MCI)	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Petroleum	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  This	  section	  is	  a	  more	  detailed	  treatment	  of	  a	  summarized	  argument	  in	  Edward	  Cunningham,	  “China’s	  
Energy	  Governance:	  Perception	  and	  Reality”,	  MIT	  Center	  for	  International	  Studies	  Audit	  of	  the	  
Conventional	  Wisdom,	  (March	  2007).	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Industry	  (MPI)	  while	  reduced	  demand	  required	  the	  shuttering	  of	  many	  plants	  and	  refineries.	  	  This	  consolidation	  then	  moderated	  with	  the	  decentralization	  trends	  unleashed	  by	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  mid-­‐decade.	  The	  markedly	  lower	  growth	  rates	  in	  1971	  coincided	  with	  a	  partial	  re-­‐consolidation	  effort,	  whereby	  the	  MOEP	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  Utilization	  were	  combined	  to	  form	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  and	  Electric	  Power,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Petroleum	  Industry	  merged	  with	  the	  Coal	  and	  Chemical	  ministries	  to	  form	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Fuels	  and	  Chemicals.	  	  	  
By	  mid-­‐1980	  the	  economy’s	  growth	  rate	  began	  to	  drop,	  reaching	  a	  mere	  five	  percent	  the	  following	  year.	  	  The	  central	  government	  then	  launched	  a	  third	  wave	  of	  attempted	  administrative	  centralization	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  previous	  State	  Energy	  Commission	  (SEC).	  The	  SEC	  never	  received	  dedicated	  staff,	  an	  independent	  base	  of	  operations	  and	  funding,	  leading	  to	  one	  observer	  deeming	  its	  creation	  ‘one	  of	  the	  major	  non-­‐events	  of	  1980’.14	  	  Previously	  existing	  agencies	  continued	  to	  operate	  as	  before,	  and	  the	  commission	  dissolved	  two	  years	  later	  amid	  9-­‐10	  percent	  economic	  growth	  rates	  and	  a	  proven	  inability	  to	  raise	  the	  capital	  necessary	  to	  support	  sufficient	  power	  generation	  for	  the	  burgeoning	  national	  economy.	  As	  scholar	  Victor	  Shih	  notes:	  “The	  planners’	  tight	  grip	  on	  the	  economy	  was	  first	  loosened	  when	  growth	  far	  exceeded	  the	  plan	  in	  1982	  and	  in	  1983.	  	  Deng	  responded	  by	  sending	  a	  series	  of	  political	  signals	  to	  members	  of	  his	  factions	  in	  the	  provinces	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Thomas	  Fingar,	  “Implementing	  Energy	  Policy:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Demise	  of	  the	  State	  Energy	  Commission”,	  in	  
D.	  Lampton	  (ed.)	  Policy	  Implementation	  in	  Post-­‐Mao	  China,	  (Berkeley:	  Univ.	  of	  California	  Press),	  1987,	  
p.207.	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increase	  investment	  and	  to	  take	  their	  own	  initiatives”.15	  	  Shih	  also	  argues	  that	  in	  early	  1984	  the	  economic	  figures	  from	  1983	  revealed	  “continual	  economic	  vigor	  and	  a	  thirst	  for	  capital	  from	  the	  grassroots	  level…[and]	  in	  late	  April	  1984…the	  Meeting	  
for	  Some	  Coastal	  Cities…had	  a	  strong	  agenda	  to	  devolve	  investment	  and	  lending	  power	  to	  the	  localities.”16	  	  The	  growth	  of	  the	  early	  1980s	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  new,	  reform-­‐oriented	  leadership	  to	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  removing	  government	  from	  commercial	  enterprise	  work	  and	  the	  business	  of	  controlling	  energy	  production.	  
	  
Decentralization	  I:	  Rise	  of	  Corporations	  (1982-­‐1998)	  
This	  need	  for	  capital	  and	  technology	  acquisition,	  most	  immediately	  for	  the	  electric	  power	  generation	  necessary	  to	  the	  industrial	  growth	  that	  China’s	  leaders	  were	  encouraging,	  led	  to	  1986	  policy	  changes	  that	  allowed	  the	  entrance	  of	  new	  investors	  upstream	  into	  coal,	  electric	  power	  and	  oil	  production.	  	  Provincial,	  municipal,	  and	  local	  governments,	  as	  well	  as	  private	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firms	  were	  encouraged	  to	  invest	  in	  coal	  mines,	  power	  plants,	  and	  a	  range	  of	  oil	  refining	  and	  production	  activities.	  	  In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  this	  step-­‐change	  in	  energy	  production,	  energy	  assets	  were	  also	  corporatized.	  During	  this	  decade	  major	  energy	  firms	  were	  established	  such	  as	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  (Group)	  Corporation	  (CNPC),	  China	  Petrochemical	  (Group)	  Corporation	  (Sinopec)	  and	  China	  National	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Victor	  Shih,	  Factions	  and	  Finance	  in	  China:	  Elite	  Conflict	  and	  Inflation	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2007),	  p.110.	  
16	  Ibid.,	  p.114-­‐5.	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Offshore	  Oil	  Corporation	  (CNOOC)	  in	  the	  oil	  industry	  as	  well	  as	  Huaneng	  Group	  in	  electricity	  generation.	  In	  1988	  the	  ministries	  of	  Petroleum,	  Water	  Conservancy	  and	  Power,	  and	  Coal	  Industries	  were	  abolished,	  and	  many	  of	  their	  regulatory	  responsibilities	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  new	  corporations.	  	  
Such	  a	  combination	  of	  trends	  necessitated,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  conservative	  leaders,	  a	  movement	  to	  reassert	  Beijing’s	  authority	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  centralized	  Ministry	  of	  Energy	  (MOE).	  The	  ministry	  was	  launched	  in	  June	  of	  1988,	  as	  economic	  growth	  began	  to	  dip,	  reaching	  four	  percent	  the	  following	  year,	  and	  was	  designed	  as	  a	  fourth	  attempt	  to	  provide	  central	  oversight	  over	  the	  newly	  complex	  set	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  energy	  sector.	  The	  ministry	  never	  integrated	  well	  with	  the	  much	  more	  powerful	  State	  Planning	  Commission	  (SPC).	  	  This	  gap	  in	  coordination	  was	  perhaps	  best	  illustrated	  in	  the	  major	  disparity	  between	  energy	  demand	  estimates	  that	  the	  SPC	  and	  MOE	  calculated	  for	  the	  Eighth	  Five-­‐year	  Plan.	  	  The	  1991	  SPC	  estimate	  for	  total	  required	  electric	  power	  build-­‐out	  for	  the	  1991-­‐1995	  period	  equalled	  83.6	  GW,	  only	  70	  percent	  the	  121.7	  GW	  estimate	  of	  the	  MOE.17	  	  This	  new	  ‘supra-­‐ministry’	  soon	  followed	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  its	  predecessors,	  however,	  suffering	  from	  internal	  competition	  and	  dissension,	  and	  was	  disbanded	  less	  than	  five	  years	  later,	  in	  March	  1993.	  As	  one	  scholar	  wrote:	  “Unfortunately,	  the	  MOE	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  collection	  of	  the	  same	  vested	  interests	  within	  one	  umbrella	  organization,	  the	  same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Xiaoqian	  Zhou	  (ed.)	  China’s	  Electric	  Power	  Program,	  (Beijing:Water	  Power	  Publishing,	  2007),	  p.117	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personnel,	  the	  same	  allegiance,	  and	  the	  same	  entrenched	  interests…the	  MOE	  was	  never	  able	  to	  function	  as	  a	  cohesive	  group.”18	  
The	  creation	  of	  energy	  corporations	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s	  marked	  an	  important	  break	  from	  past	  governance	  patterns,	  and	  represented	  a	  new	  model	  of	  both	  interacting	  with	  the	  rapidly	  evolving	  global	  energy	  market	  outside	  China’s	  borders	  and	  also	  attracting	  the	  financing	  and	  technology	  necessary	  to	  harness	  the	  energy	  potential	  within	  the	  country.	  This	  need	  was	  articulated	  in	  numerous	  official	  documents,	  including	  a	  September	  10,	  1993	  MOEP	  instruction:	  “…foreign	  investment	  in	  the	  nation’s	  electric	  power	  industry	  not	  only	  supplements	  inadequate	  domestic	  construction	  funds	  and	  ability	  to	  manufacture	  power	  generating	  equipment,	  moreover	  the	  technology	  and	  management	  experiences	  that	  foreign	  investment	  will	  bring,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  economic	  efficiency	  created,	  will	  be	  good…in	  the	  past	  10	  years	  alone	  foreign	  investment	  constitutes	  11	  percent	  of	  electric	  power	  construction	  investment.”19	  	  A	  1994	  Ministry	  of	  Electric	  Power	  plan	  reiterates	  this	  need:	  “China	  can	  fulfil	  about	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	  new	  business	  [which	  includes	  rehabilitation	  programs	  for	  existing	  plants]	  internally,	  leaving	  $25	  billion	  for	  foreign	  suppliers;	  such	  help	  will	  be	  welcomed,	  provided	  it	  is	  accompanied	  by	  foreign	  finance”.20	  The	  emergence	  of	  corporations	  also	  marked	  a	  critical	  step	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Daniel	  Chow,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  China’s	  Enterprise	  Conglomerates:	  A	  	  
Study	  of	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  Electric	  Power	  Industry	  in	  China.”	  Law	  and	  Policy	  in	  International	  	  
Business	  28(2)	  (1997),	  p.	  406.	  
19	  MOEP	  document	  no.	  341,	  “Expanding	  the	  Scale	  and	  Use	  of	  Foreign	  Investment	  to	  Accelerate	  Electric	  
Power	  Development”,	  September	  10,	  1993.	  	  In	  Xiaoqian	  Zhou	  (ed.)	  China’s	  Electric	  Power	  Program,	  
(Beijing:Water	  Power	  Publishing,	  2007),	  p.826.	  
20	  Pei-­‐Yee	  Woo,	  “China’s	  Electric	  Power	  Market:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  IPPs”,	  (PESD	  Working	  Paper	  No.45),	  
August	  16,	  2005.	  p.11.	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‘marketization’	  of	  China’s	  infrastructure.	  	  As	  one	  scholar	  has	  noted,	  corporate	  involvement	  “fundamentally	  changed	  expectations	  about	  electricity	  –	  power	  was	  now	  regarded	  as	  a	  commodity	  to	  be	  bought	  and	  sold	  on	  the	  market,	  rather	  than	  allocated	  by	  government”.21	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  corporation	  emerged	  in	  part	  as	  a	  means	  of	  organizing	  productive	  assets	  and	  property	  rights.	  The	  proliferating	  government	  entities	  discussed	  above	  claimed	  ownership	  over	  financial	  stakes	  in	  SOEs	  that	  overlapped	  and	  that	  were	  often	  illegitimate	  and	  at	  odds	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  logic	  of	  corporatization22	  stemmed	  from	  “its	  ability	  to	  specify	  ownership	  rights	  and	  to	  legally	  separate	  enterprise	  from	  state	  administration”.23	  The	  “Company	  Law”,	  which	  was	  passed	  on	  December	  29,	  1993,	  served	  as	  the	  primary	  legal	  framework	  to	  identify	  claims	  over	  liabilities	  and	  assets	  of	  the	  rapidly	  diversifying	  economy,	  and	  to	  regulate	  formal	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  make	  firms	  more	  independent	  of	  political	  influence.	  In	  fact,	  articles	  3	  and	  4	  clearly	  state	  that	  the	  liability	  and	  rights	  of	  shareholders	  of	  a	  firm	  are	  in	  proportion	  to	  their	  capital	  contribution	  to	  the	  firm.	  Moreover,	  article	  7	  explicitly	  states	  that	  SOEs	  under	  reorganization	  to	  corporation	  status	  must	  “identify	  and	  verify”	  the	  firm’s	  assets	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Yi-­‐Chong	  Xu,	  Powering	  China:	  Reforming	  the	  Electric	  power	  Industry	  in	  China,	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate)	  2002.	  
p.126.	  
22 Corporatization is defined as the diversification of ownership structure, and in this paper particular 
attention is afforded the introduction of sub-central state and of nonstate parties as shareholders “to make 
SOEs operate as if they were private firms facing a competitive market or, if monopolies, efficient 
regulation”. (Mary Shirley, “Bureaucrats in business: the roles of privatization versus corporatization in 
state-owned enterprise reform,” World Development 27, no. 1 (1999), p. 115).  See also Colin Xu, Tian 
Zhu, and Yi-min Lin, “Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform: Evidence from China,” 
Economics of Transition 13, no. 1 (2005): 1-24. 
23	  Xu,	  p.100.	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“determine	  the	  respective	  owners	  of	  the	  property	  rights	  therein,	  and	  settle	  its	  creditor’s	  rights	  and	  liabilities”.24	  The	  law	  therefore	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  both	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  nest	  of	  outstanding	  claims	  against	  many	  SOEs	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  and	  to	  at	  least	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  removing	  party	  political	  actors	  from	  the	  daily	  management	  of	  firms.	  	  
By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  the	  central	  administration	  of	  the	  energy	  sector	  was	  again	  performed	  by	  disparate	  entities,	  many	  of	  which	  had	  been	  reinstated,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rising	  energy	  corporations	  that	  were	  increasingly	  straddling	  commercial	  and	  regulatory	  functions.	  	  This	  array	  of	  government	  actors	  included,	  but	  was	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  State	  Development	  and	  Planning	  Commission	  (SDPC),	  the	  State	  Economic	  and	  Trade	  Commission	  (SETC),	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Petroleum	  Industry,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Geology	  and	  Mineral	  Resources,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Electric	  Power,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Land	  and	  Natural	  Resources,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Coal	  Industry.	  In	  1998,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  government-­‐wide	  restructuring	  of	  industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  ‘pillar	  industries’	  of	  energy,	  transportation,	  and	  telecommunications,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Coal	  Industry	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Electric	  Power	  Industry	  (MEPI)	  were	  abolished	  and	  the	  State	  Administration	  of	  Coal	  Industry	  (SACI)	  was	  formed	  under	  the	  SETC,	  granting	  provincial	  governments	  operational	  management	  over	  coal	  mining	  enterprises	  and	  larger	  scale	  electric	  power	  projects.	  Much	  of	  the	  operational	  authority	  for	  the	  electricity	  industry	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  newly	  established	  State	  Power	  Corporation	  of	  China	  (SPCC).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  See	  <www.cclaw.net/download/companylaw.asp>.	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Decentralization	  II:	  Rise	  of	  Multiple	  Agencies	  (1998-­‐2008)	  
The	  pluralization	  of	  corporations	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  led	  to	  a	  major	  set	  of	  industrial	  and	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  1998	  that	  significantly	  reduced	  central	  government	  capacity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  personnel,	  dedicated	  funding	  and	  institutional	  structure.	  Despite	  the	  mobilization	  of	  corporate	  resources,	  the	  central	  state	  did	  not	  initially	  redeploy	  its	  resources	  to	  guide	  energy	  investments	  at	  the	  firm	  level.	  Philip	  Andrews-­‐Speed	  captures	  this	  process	  well,	  observing:	  
‘[i]n	  the	  past,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  major	  state-­‐owned	  energy	  companies	  were	  able	  to	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  policies	  and	  plans	  for	  their	  individual	  industries.	  Progressive	  corporatization	  of	  these	  companies	  has	  reduced	  the	  power	  of	  these	  executives	  to	  influence	  national	  policy	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  but	  the	  capacity	  of	  government	  to	  lead	  has	  not	  been	  enhanced	  in	  a	  commensurate	  way.	  Indeed,	  with	  more	  players	  in	  the	  sector,	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  manage	  the	  energy	  sector	  has	  actually	  diminished.’25	  	  Barry	  Naughton	  has	  also	  recognized	  the	  migration	  of	  energy	  decisions	  to	  the	  firm	  level,	  writing:	  	  
‘Particularly	  following	  the	  revival	  of	  state	  sector	  profitability,	  some	  of	  these	  organizations	  are	  extremely	  rich	  and	  powerful.	  The	  state	  companies	  under	  central	  SASAC’s	  [State-­‐owned	  Asset	  and	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission]	  purview	  include,	  for	  example,	  the	  State	  Electricity	  Grid	  and	  the	  big	  electric	  power–generation	  companies…This	  middle	  layer	  of	  the	  state	  economy	  is	  the	  least	  transparent…in	  between	  the	  fully	  corporatized	  and	  often	  listed	  companies,	  and	  the	  national	  government.”26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Philip	  Andrews-­‐Speed,	  “China’s	  energy	  woes:	  running	  on	  empty”,	  Far	  Eastern	  Economic	  Review,	  June	  
2005,	  p.17.	  
26	  Barry	  Naughton,	  “Claiming	  profit	  for	  the	  State:	  SASAC	  and	  the	  capital	  management	  budget”,	  China	  
Leadership	  Monitor,	  vol.	  18,	  Spring	  2006,	  p.4.	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In	  March	  of	  1998	  the	  NPC	  approved	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  plan	  that	  had	  been	  designed	  by	  the	  Politburo	  the	  year	  before	  to	  consolidate	  the	  central	  government	  apparatus	  and	  state-­‐owned	  industry.	  	  The	  40	  ministries	  overseeing	  China’s	  growth	  were	  reduced	  to	  29,	  with	  many	  employees	  transferred	  to	  SOEs,	  research	  institutes,	  quasi-­‐private	  firms,	  or	  simply	  laid	  off.	  	  The	  reforms	  affected	  over	  33,000	  central	  government	  personnel	  and	  within	  two	  years	  had	  laid	  off	  more	  than	  4	  million	  government	  employees.27	  	  In	  the	  energy	  sector,	  power	  struggles	  between	  the	  SDPC	  and	  the	  SETC	  ensued,	  and	  by	  February	  2001	  the	  SACI	  and	  coal,	  power,	  and	  other	  administrations	  under	  the	  SETC	  were	  closed,	  as	  were	  most	  of	  their	  provincial,	  prefectural,	  and	  county	  counterparts.	  In	  March	  2003,	  the	  SETC	  itself	  was	  abolished	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  functions	  transferred	  to	  the	  SDPC,	  subsequently	  renamed	  the	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Commission	  (NDRC).	  Immediately	  prior	  to	  this	  major	  realignment,	  the	  nation’s	  first	  independent	  regulator	  for	  the	  power	  industry	  was	  established:	  the	  State	  Electricity	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (SERC).	  	  The	  emergence	  of	  this	  unprecedented,	  arm’s-­‐length	  body	  heralded	  what	  many	  scholars	  have	  termed	  a	  new	  era	  of	  the	  ‘regulatory	  state’	  in	  energy.28	  	  Others,	  such	  as	  Margaret	  Pearson,	  argue	  that	  such	  restructuring	  is	  another	  attempt	  to	  strengthen	  state	  control	  but	  continues	  to	  be	  plagued	  by	  historical	  institutional	  fragmentation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Luo	  Gan,	  “Explanation	  of	  Plan	  for	  Institutional	  Restructuring	  of	  the	  State	  Council”,	  Ta	  Kung	  Pao,	  March	  
7,	  1998	  (in	  FBIS,	  DR/CHI,	  March	  10,	  1998,	  98-­‐068);	  Cheng	  Li,	  “China	  in	  1999:	  Seeking	  Common	  Ground	  at	  a	  
Time	  of	  Tension	  and	  Conflict”,	  Asian	  Survey,	  40:1	  (2000),	  p.122.	  	  For	  related	  WTO	  accession	  issues	  please	  
see	  Joseph	  Fewsmith,	  “China	  and	  the	  WTO:	  The	  Politics	  Behind	  the	  Agreement,”	  National	  Bureau	  of	  
Research	  (NBR)	  Analysis	  10:5,	  Essay	  2	  (November	  1999).	  
28	  For	  representative	  works	  supporting	  this	  perspective,	  see	  Dali	  Yang,	  Remaking	  the	  Chinese	  leviathan:	  
Market	  transition	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  governance	  in	  China	  (Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005).	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She	  writes:	  “the	  most	  recent	  round	  of	  bureaucratic	  restructuring	  in	  March	  2003	  strengthened	  the	  state’s	  efforts	  to	  maintain	  authority	  over	  strategic	  assets”.29	  	  	  	  
However,	  while	  some	  degree	  of	  consolidation	  under	  the	  NDRC	  did	  take	  place	  by	  the	  early	  2000s,	  a	  range	  of	  new	  entities,	  like	  SERC,	  began	  to	  proliferate	  and	  become	  linked	  to	  the	  energy	  sector.	  At	  the	  central	  level,	  the	  State-­‐Owned	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  (SASAC),	  established	  in	  2003,	  claims	  nominal	  ownership	  rights	  over,	  and	  bears	  responsibility	  for,	  the	  management	  and	  disposal	  of	  certain	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  (including	  merger	  and	  acquisition	  approval	  and	  other	  energy	  asset	  restructuring).	  The	  commission	  also	  has	  input	  into	  personnel	  movements	  concerning	  individuals	  of	  vice-­‐ministerial	  rank	  and	  below.	  The	  State	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (SEPA)	  was	  recently	  raised	  to	  ministerial	  rank	  to	  become	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environmental	  Protection	  (MEP),	  and	  enforces	  environmental	  standards	  and	  compliance	  by	  energy	  firms,	  while	  resource	  extraction	  rights,	  operation	  management,	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  responsibilities	  are	  largely	  shared	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Land	  and	  Resources	  (MOLAR),	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  Resources	  (MWR),	  and	  the	  State	  Administration	  of	  Coal	  Mine	  Safety	  (SACMS).	  	  The	  interests	  of	  these	  entities,	  of	  course,	  do	  not	  always	  align.	  	  SERC	  and	  the	  pricing	  bureau	  of	  the	  NDRC	  seek	  to	  strengthen	  competition	  by	  maintaining	  higher	  numbers	  of	  energy	  firms	  in	  industries	  such	  as	  power	  generation.	  In	  contrast,	  other	  central	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Margaret	  Pearson	  “The	  Business	  of	  Governing	  Business	  in	  China:	  Institutions	  and	  Norms	  of	  the	  
Emerging	  Regulatory	  State”,	  World	  Politics,	  vol.57	  (January	  2005),	  p.	  304-­‐5.	  	  See	  also	  Margaret	  Pearson,	  
“Governing	  the	  Chinese	  Economy:	  Regulatory	  Reform	  in	  the	  Service	  of	  the	  State,”	  Public	  Administration	  
Review	  67,	  no.	  4	  (2007):	  718-­‐730.	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agencies,	  such	  a	  SASAC,	  aim	  to	  maximize	  returns	  on	  assets	  by	  encouraging	  the	  consolidation	  of	  existing	  firms.	  
This	  fractured	  system	  of	  energy	  governance	  in	  China	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  energy	  industry’s	  fractured	  structure.	  	  The	  following	  section	  will	  address	  the	  market	  structure	  of	  China’s	  oil	  and	  gas,	  coal,	  and	  electric	  power	  industries	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  illustrate	  the	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  concentrated	  oil	  and	  gas	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  fragmented	  coal	  and	  electric	  power	  on	  the	  other.	  	  While	  much	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature	  is	  concerned	  with	  reforms	  in	  the	  Chinese	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  such	  firms,	  the	  vast	  bulk	  of	  national	  energy	  production	  relies	  on	  coal	  and	  electric	  power	  –	  markets	  as	  fragmented	  as	  the	  authorities	  attempting	  to	  regulate	  them.	  	  
National	  Energy	  Structure:	  An	  Overview	  
Oil	  and	  Gas	  	  
Scholarly	  and	  political	  analyses	  of	  China’s	  energy	  system	  often	  focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry,	  motivated	  by:	  i)	  the	  perceived	  strategic	  nature	  of	  these	  hydrocarbons;	  ii)	  China’s	  relatively	  recent	  emergence	  as	  a	  net	  oil	  product	  importer	  and	  net	  crude	  oil	  importer	  in	  1993	  and	  1996	  respectively;	  and	  iii)	  the	  increasingly	  global	  investment	  activities	  of	  Chinese	  oil	  and	  gas	  firms	  since	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  This	  attention	  has	  reinforced	  the	  view	  that	  China’s	  energy	  sector	  is	  heavily	  concentrated	  and	  dominated	  by	  a	  handful	  of	  large	  incumbent	  firms,	  financed	  largely	  by	  the	  central	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government,	  and	  therefore	  resistant	  to	  major	  change,	  institutional	  or	  otherwise.30	  	  Unlike	  analyses	  of	  the	  private	  or	  quasi-­‐private	  sector	  in	  China,	  which	  frame	  state	  involvement	  as	  a	  largely	  “helping	  hand”	  model	  of	  development,	  analysis	  of	  the	  energy	  sector	  often	  characterizes	  Beijing	  as	  an	  interventionist	  state	  actor	  pursuing	  regressive	  pricing	  and	  finance	  policies.31	  These	  perspectives	  argue	  that	  barriers	  to	  market	  entry	  for	  non-­‐incumbent	  firms	  are	  high,	  incentives	  to	  support	  protectionism	  by	  incumbent	  firms	  are	  many,	  financial	  resources	  for	  non-­‐central	  state	  actors	  are	  limited,	  and	  political	  pressure	  to	  subsidize	  prices	  dominates	  the	  political	  economy	  landscape.	  
This	  analytical	  framework	  is	  influential	  and	  its	  implications	  significant,	  because	  it	  implies	  that	  forces	  for	  change	  –	  technological,	  financial,	  or	  regulatory	  –	  are	  greatly	  weakened	  in	  China’s	  energy	  sector.	  	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  data	  culled	  from	  sub-­‐sectors	  that	  are	  most	  exposed	  to	  international	  markets	  (and	  therefore	  most	  “visible”	  to	  international	  observers)	  support	  this	  characterization.	  	  The	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  industries	  have	  remained	  cartelized	  in	  structure	  despite	  the	  introduction	  of	  significant	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  various	  reforms	  related	  to	  WTO	  compliance	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  	  China’s	  three	  major	  oil	  and	  gas	  firms	  traditionally	  functioned	  as	  separate	  segments	  of	  the	  supply	  chain.	  	  CNPC	  was	  created	  in	  1988	  to	  manage	  China’s	  oil	  and	  gas	  exploration	  and	  production	  onshore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Peter	  Nolan	  and	  J.	  Zhang,	  “Globalization	  Challenge	  for	  Large	  Firms	  from	  Developing	  Countries:	  China’s	  
Oil	  and	  Aerospace	  Industries,”	  European	  Management	  Journal	  21,	  no.	  3	  (2003):	  285-­‐299.	  
31	  For	  example	  Amy	  Jaffe	  et.	  al.,	  “Beijing's	  oil	  diplomacy,”	  Survival	  44,	  no.	  1	  (2002):	  115-­‐134;	  Robert	  Ebel,	  
China's	  Energy	  Future:	  The	  Middle	  Kingdom	  Seeks	  Its	  Place	  in	  the	  Sun	  (Center	  for	  Strategic	  &	  International	  
Studies,	  2005);	  Linda	  Jakobson	  and	  Daojiong	  Zha,	  “China	  and	  the	  Worldwide	  Search	  for	  Oil	  Security,”	  Asia-­‐
Pacific	  Review	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2006):	  60-­‐73.	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both	  domestically	  and	  internationally.	  Sinopec	  was	  established	  in	  1983	  to	  build	  and	  operate	  China’s	  refining	  capacity	  downstream	  and	  petrochemical	  production.	  CNOOC	  was	  created	  in	  1982	  to	  specialize	  in	  the	  exploration,	  development,	  and	  production	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  in	  China's	  territorial	  waters	  (with	  a	  depth	  over	  five	  meters).	  	  
However,	  this	  form	  of	  state	  control,	  achieved	  through	  the	  corporate	  separation	  of	  upstream	  exploration	  and	  production	  of	  crude	  from	  downstream	  refining	  of	  product,	  proved	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  once	  upstream	  price	  reforms	  were	  designed	  to	  stimulate	  production.	  	  Partial	  liberalization	  of	  crude	  oil	  prices	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  through	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  rendered	  CNPC’s	  onshore	  exploration	  and	  production	  activities	  upstream	  increasingly	  profitable.	  	  Such	  liberalization	  did	  not	  occur	  downstream	  in	  the	  oil	  product	  market.	  	  Heavily	  regulated	  downstream	  retail	  prices	  for	  oil	  products	  such	  as	  diesel	  and	  gasoline	  increased	  losses	  for	  the	  refining	  activities	  of	  Sinopec.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1983	  the	  central	  government	  introduced	  a	  three	  track	  pricing	  system.	  	  A	  fixed	  annual	  quota	  of	  output	  was	  determined,	  and	  over	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  that	  output	  was	  sold	  at	  a	  first,	  low	  price	  of	  RMB100/ton	  ($5.60/ton),	  while	  over	  one-­‐quarter	  was	  sold	  at	  a	  second,	  higher	  price	  of	  RMB555/ton	  ($31.00/ton).	  	  Above-­‐quota	  production	  (six	  percent	  of	  total	  production	  that	  year)	  could	  be	  sold	  at	  a	  negotiated	  price	  on	  the	  market.	  	  The	  low	  price	  was	  abolished	  by	  1993,	  at	  which	  time	  over	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  crude	  oil	  was	  sold	  at	  negotiated	  prices.	  	  In	  refining,	  foreign	  companies	  had	  begun	  to	  enter	  oil	  storage,	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product	  importation,	  and	  third-­‐party	  processing,	  as	  well	  as	  provincial	  and	  local	  companies.32	  
Rising	  imports	  (leading	  to	  China’s	  switch	  to	  net	  importer	  status	  of	  oil	  product	  that	  year)	  led	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  managing	  oil	  consumption	  and	  by	  1994	  the	  oil	  pricing	  market	  was	  dismantled.	  	  All	  crude	  and	  product	  prices	  returned	  to	  being	  fixed	  by	  the	  central	  government.	  	  In	  April	  all	  import	  rights	  were	  abolished.	  	  As	  Andrews-­‐Speed	  has	  written:	  “Thus,	  having	  introduced	  an	  oil-­‐pricing	  system	  which	  was	  evolving	  rapidly	  towards	  being	  an	  open	  market,	  the	  government	  has	  made	  a	  rapid	  retreat.	  Prices	  are	  now	  tightly	  controlled	  and	  respond	  only	  sluggishly	  to	  the	  international	  markets…In	  one	  step	  the	  government	  reversed	  ten	  years	  of	  reform.”33	  	  	  
	   The	  wide-­‐ranging	  industrial	  and	  governmental	  reforms	  introduced	  in	  1998	  sought	  to	  improve	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  these	  three	  firms	  by	  vertically	  integrating	  them,	  with	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  largest	  (CNPC	  and	  Sinopec).	  After	  the	  reforms,	  Sinopec	  held	  both	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  assets	  in	  China’s	  southern	  and	  eastern	  regions	  while	  CNPC	  held	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  assets	  in	  the	  north	  and	  western	  regions.	  	  To	  deepen	  commercial	  reforms	  and	  separate	  regulatory	  function	  and	  corporate	  management,	  all	  three	  firms	  listed	  portions	  of	  their	  assets	  on	  foreign	  exchanges	  through	  newly	  established	  subsidiary	  firms.	  
Yet,	  despite	  these	  considerable	  attempts	  to	  reform	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  market,	  much	  remained	  the	  same.	  	  Peter	  Nolan	  captures	  this	  stagnation	  well,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Philip	  Andrews-­‐Speed,	  “Reform	  of	  China’s	  Energy	  Sector:	  Slow	  Progress	  to	  an	  Uncertain	  Goal”,	  in	  Sarah	  
Cook,	  J.	  Zhuang,	  and	  S.	  Yao	  (ed.),	  The	  Chinese	  Economy	  Under	  Transition	  (Macmillan,	  2000),	  p.113.	  
33	  Ibid.,	  pp.114,	  117.	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and	  highlights	  remaining	  unresolved	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  continuing	  influence	  of	  the	  central	  government	  and	  competition	  between	  the	  firms,	  writing:	  “The	  relationship	  between	  the	  floated	  company	  and	  the	  parent	  remains	  unresolved.	  	  While	  the	  floated	  ‘children’	  [subsidiary	  firms	  listed	  on	  international	  stock	  markets],	  may	  wish	  for	  prosperous	  independence	  from	  their	  ‘parents’,	  the	  ‘parents’	  (CNPC	  and	  Sinopec)	  have	  responsibility	  for	  a	  total	  of	  1.5	  million	  employees	  and	  several	  million	  family	  members.”34	  	  He	  concludes	  that	  the	  “Chinese	  oil	  and	  petrochemical	  industry	  is	  still	  highly	  protected.”35	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Market	  Concentration	  of	  Energy	  Sub-­‐Sectors,	  Post-­‐1998	  Reform	  
Top	  Firm	   Share	  of	  Production	  in	  Respective	  Industry	  
	   1998	   2003	   2010	  
CNPC	  (Crude	  Oil)	   67.3%	   64.5%	   61.4%	  
CNPC	  (Natural	  Gas)	   70.8%	   72.9%	   74.9%	  
Huaneng	  (Electricity)	   2.4%	   9.7%	   11.8%	  
Shenhua	  (Coal)	   0.6%	   5.1%	   6.9%	  	  
Source:	  NBS	  China	  Energy	  Yearbook,	  various	  years;	  NBS	  China	  Electricity	  Yearbook,	  various	  years;	  CNPC	  Annual	  Report	  2010;	  China	  Economy	  Supervision	  Center	  (ed.)	  China’s	  Industrial	  
Map:	  Energy	  (Beijing:	  Social	  Sciences	  Academic	  Press,	  2006,	  p.49,	  134;	  INNET,	  China’s	  Energy	  Outlook	  2004,	  p.11;	  LBNL,	  China	  Energy	  Databook	  2008;	  Author’s	  estimates.	  	  Electricity	  ratio	  based	  on	  installed	  capacity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Peter Nolan, “China and the Global Business Revolution,” Camb. J. Econ. 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2002), 
p.125.  See also F. Fesharaki and K. Wu, “Revitalizing China's Petroleum Industry Through 
Reorganization: Will It Work?,” Oil & Gas Journal 96, no. 32 (1998). 
35	  Nolan,	  p.126.	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Indeed,	  a	  review	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  production	  figures	  since	  the	  1998	  reforms	  reveals	  little	  significant	  change	  in	  ownership	  structure.	  	  Barriers	  to	  significant	  market	  entry	  have	  remained	  high.	  	  As	  Figure	  1	  illustrates,	  one	  firm	  –	  CNPC	  –	  accounts	  for	  well	  over	  one-­‐half	  of	  China’s	  crude	  oil	  production	  and	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  its	  natural	  gas	  supply.	  	  CNPC	  has	  actually	  consolidated	  its	  dominance	  in	  gas	  over	  time	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  domestic	  market	  structure	  change	  in	  crude	  oil	  is	  also	  apparent.	  Andrews-­‐Speed	  highlights	  the	  continuing	  obstacles	  to	  competition	  in	  the	  industry,	  arguing:	  “The	  issue	  which	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  addressed	  is	  whether	  one	  oil	  company	  may	  invest	  and	  conduct	  exploration,	  production,	  refining	  or	  distribution	  in	  the	  other’s	  territory…The	  longer	  the	  period	  of	  [regulatory]	  ambiguity,	  the	  stronger	  the	  position	  of	  the	  companies.	  One	  glaring	  deficiency	  in	  the	  legal	  framework	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  petroleum	  law.”36	  	  Given	  the	  reform	  challenges	  present	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry,	  it	  is	  understandable	  how	  analysis	  of	  China’s	  energy	  market,	  particularly	  when	  viewed	  through	  this	  prism,	  would	  support	  a	  bias	  privileging	  a	  more	  monolithic	  status	  quo.	  
	  
Coal	  and	  Electric	  Power	  
Despite	  the	  concentration	  of	  actors	  in	  China’s	  oil	  and	  gas	  industry,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  term	  “fragmented	  authoritarianism”,	  which	  accurately	  and	  persuasively	  framed	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  a	  reform-­‐era	  China,	  emerged	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Philip	  Andrews-­‐Speed,	  S.	  Dow,	  and	  Z.	  Gao,	  “The	  ongoing	  reforms	  to	  China's	  government	  and	  state	  
sector:	  the	  case	  of	  the	  energy	  industry,”	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  China	  (2000),	  p.15.	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from	  a	  study	  of	  China’s	  electric	  power	  system.37	  	  Returning	  to	  Figure	  1,	  the	  coal	  and	  electricity	  statistics	  reveal	  these	  markets	  to	  be	  considerably	  less	  concentrated	  in	  structure	  than	  their	  crude	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  counterparts.	  	  Shenhua	  Group,	  China’s	  leading	  coal	  supplier,	  has	  only	  recently	  neared	  seven	  percent	  of	  national	  production.	  	  In	  contrast	  its	  American	  counterpart,	  Peabody	  Energy,	  commands	  over	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  US	  coal	  market.	  Huaneng	  Group,	  the	  largest	  power	  producer	  in	  China,	  produces	  just	  over	  12	  percent	  of	  national	  installed	  electricity	  capacity.	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Dominance	  of	  Coal:	  Primary	  Energy	  Production	  
	   1976	   1986	   1996	   2006	  
Coal	   68.8%	   72.4	  %	   74.9%	   75.7%	  
Oil	  and	  Gas	   27.5%	   23.3%	   18.9%	   15.3%	  
Other	   3.7%	   4.3%	   6.2%	   9.0%	  	  
Source:	  LBNL,	  China	  Energy	  Databook.	  Data	  normalized	  (EJ)	  and	  percentages	  calculated.	  	  As	  Figure	  2	  illustrates,	  the	  nation’s	  coal	  industry	  forms	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  sector,	  consistently	  accounting	  for	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  China’s	  national	  primary	  energy	  production.	  	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  markets,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  coal	  and	  electricity	  industries,	  upon	  which	  China’s	  economic	  growth	  is	  based,	  have	  been	  anything	  but	  static.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal	  and	  Michel	  Oksenberg,	  “Bureaucratic	  Politics	  and	  Chinese	  Energy	  Development”	  (US	  
Department	  of	  Commerce,	  International	  Trade	  Administration,	  1986);	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal	  and	  Michel	  
Oksenberg	  1988).	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Ownership	  and	  Price	  Reforms	  
Coal	  Industry	  
Unlike	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  industries,	  twin	  processes	  of	  ownership	  and	  investment	  diversification	  have	  penetrated	  extensively	  upstream,	  in	  the	  coal	  market.	  	  Coal	  fuels	  over	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  primary	  energy	  consumption	  in	  China	  and	  dominates	  the	  electric	  power	  industry,	  contributing	  74	  percent	  of	  total	  electricity	  production	  in	  2013.38	  	  This	  most	  vital	  foundation	  of	  China’s	  energy	  supply	  has	  relied	  significantly	  on	  mines	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  firms	  at	  the	  provincial	  or	  local	  level.	  	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  in	  1966,	  approximately	  80	  percent	  of	  China’s	  coal	  was	  produced	  by	  “State	  Key	  Mines”	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  central	  government.	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  reform	  period	  in	  1978	  this	  ratio	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  slightly	  above	  55	  percent.	  	  By	  1995	  these	  central	  state	  mines	  contributed	  37	  percent	  of	  output.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  China	  Electricity	  Council,	  2014.	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Figure	  3.	  China’s	  Coal	  Production	  by	  Ownership	  (million	  tonnes)	  
	  
Source:	  LBNL,	  China	  Energy	  Databook.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Much	  of	  this	  variation	  in	  ownership	  over	  time	  is	  the	  result	  of	  limited	  central	  state	  capacity	  to	  increase	  supply	  through	  SOE	  mines	  administered	  by	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments	  during	  periods	  of	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  and	  resulting	  energy	  shortage.	  	  	  This	  shortage	  led	  to	  the	  promulgation	  of	  policies	  that	  encouraged	  local	  non-­‐state	  mines	  (LNSM)	  to	  grow	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  in	  production.	  This	  cycle	  is	  evident	  in	  Figure	  4,	  which	  illustrates	  the	  greater	  volatility	  of	  LNSM	  in	  comparison	  to	  mines	  owned	  by	  the	  central	  and	  local	  state.	  The	  figure	  also	  illustrates	  the	  greater	  time	  sensitivity	  of	  LNSM	  production	  rates.	  	  These	  mines	  were	  able	  to	  stop	  and	  start	  production	  in	  a	  much	  more	  timely	  fashion	  and	  in	  step	  with	  economic	  growth,	  while	  state-­‐owned	  mines	  at	  the	  central	  and	  local	  level	  display	  both	  growth	  rates	  clearly	  lagging	  economic	  growth	  and	  displaying	  lower	  values	  than	  LNSM.	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Responding	  to	  the	  high	  economic	  growth	  of	  1978-­‐79	  and	  then	  again	  of	  1982-­‐85,	  LNSM	  grew	  at	  rates	  that	  were	  at	  times	  multiples	  of	  the	  CSM	  and	  LSM,	  and	  well	  higher	  than	  GDP	  growth	  rates.	  	  LNSM	  growth	  averaged	  22.5	  percent	  during	  the	  boom	  of	  1982-­‐85.	  	  Subsequently,	  during	  the	  economic	  slowdown	  of	  the	  late	  1980s,	  the	  growth	  of	  LNSM	  dropped	  precipitously	  to	  rates	  lower	  than	  the	  central	  state	  mines.	  	  LNSM	  growth	  returned	  during	  the	  boom	  of	  1992-­‐95,	  averaging	  13.8	  percent	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  meagre	  0.1	  percent	  for	  CSM	  and	  1.2	  percent	  for	  LSM.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1997	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  slowing	  economy	  and	  central	  government	  rhetoric	  regarding	  the	  enforcement	  of	  regulation	  closing	  down	  LNSM	  led	  to	  significant	  declines	  in	  LNSM	  growth.39	  	  The	  overall	  pattern	  of	  LNSM	  growth	  rates	  far	  exceeding	  CSM	  and	  LSM	  growth	  rates	  during	  periods	  of	  high	  economic	  growth	  followed	  by	  LNSM	  growth	  rates	  falling	  dramatically	  (often	  below	  CSM	  and	  LSM	  rates)	  in	  periods	  of	  lower	  and	  moderating	  economic	  growth	  is	  clear.	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  such	  growth	  patterns,	  the	  overall	  share	  of	  output	  contributed	  by	  LNS	  mines	  increased	  from	  14.1	  percent	  in	  1978	  to	  38.3	  percent	  in	  2006.	  By	  2006	  more	  than	  half	  (52.0	  percent)	  of	  China’s	  coal	  was	  produced	  by	  firms	  owned	  by	  actors	  outside	  of	  the	  central	  government.	  	  As	  Elspeth	  Thomson	  has	  documented:	  	  
“By	  the	  late	  1970s	  the	  government	  had	  recognized	  that	  the	  fastest	  output	  growth	  was	  being	  achieved	  by	  the	  LNS	  mines	  and	  that	  their	  continued	  existence	  was	  vital	  to	  the	  economy.	  It	  therefore	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  spending	  the	  limited	  capital	  resources	  available	  on	  a	  few	  key	  large	  mines	  and	  infrastructure	  projects	  too	  large	  and	  capital-­‐intensive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  While	  the	  growth	  rate	  did	  decline,	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  drop	  in	  LNSM	  growth	  rates	  during	  the	  period	  
1998-­‐2002	  is	  considered	  by	  most	  to	  be	  suspect	  due	  to	  significant	  underreporting.	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for	  the	  peasants	  to	  undertake.	  Operators	  of	  local	  mines	  were	  encouraged	  to	  open	  mines	  using	  whatever	  resources	  they	  could	  find.”40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  during	  the	  most	  recent	  period	  of	  high	  economic	  growth	  since	  2002,	  during	  which	  CSM	  did	  begin	  to	  increase	  output	  rapidly,	  non-­‐state	  mine	  growth	  rates	  exceeded	  that	  of	  mines	  owned	  by	  the	  central	  and	  local	  state.	  	  
Figure	  4.	  GDP	  Growth	  and	  Mine	  Growth	  by	  Ownership	  
	  
Source:	  LBNL,	  China	  Energy	  Databook.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Elspeth	  also	  points	  out	  the	  additional	  attractions	  of	  local	  mines:	  “Besides	  mitigating	  the	  shortage	  
problem,	  relieving	  the	  critical	  lack	  of	  railway	  capacity	  on	  the	  north-­‐south	  lines,	  and	  costing	  half	  as	  much	  to	  
build	  and	  operate,	  LNS	  mines	  also	  contribute	  to	  other	  Chinese	  government	  objectives.	  They	  become	  
operational	  much	  sooner,	  add	  to	  the	  wealth	  of	  peasants,	  help	  reduce	  rural	  unemployment,	  stem	  rural-­‐
urban	  migration,	  stimulate	  the	  development	  of	  rural	  industry	  and	  help	  halt	  the	  ecological	  damage	  
resulting	  from	  the	  scavenging	  for	  firewood.”	  Elspeth	  Thomson,	  “Reforming	  China's	  coal	  industry,”	  China	  
Quarterly	  (1996):	  729.	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Financial	  data	  for	  these	  coal	  firms	  highlights	  both	  their	  economic	  importance	  and	  their	  ownership	  diversity.	  Recent	  sales	  income	  figures,	  which	  distinguish	  between	  private,	  joint	  shareholding,	  collective	  and	  foreign	  invested	  firms,	  reveal	  the	  range	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  that	  is	  obscured	  by	  aggregate	  national	  statistics.	  	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5,	  48.5	  percent	  of	  total	  sales	  income	  for	  the	  coal	  industry	  in	  2005	  was	  earned	  by	  firms	  without	  controlling	  stakes	  owned	  by	  the	  central	  or	  local	  government.41	  
Much	  of	  this	  decentralization	  of	  ownership	  and	  investment	  resulted	  from	  the	  gradual	  liberalization	  of	  coal	  pricing.	  	  Coal	  prices	  were	  partially	  liberalized	  in	  1984,	  immediately	  preceding	  the	  1986	  regulation	  allowing	  sub-­‐central	  government	  actors	  and	  firms	  to	  invest	  in	  electric	  power	  generation,	  discussed	  at	  length	  below.42	  	  Coal	  prices	  were	  reformed	  to	  account	  for	  coal	  quality	  differences	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  and	  in	  1984	  a	  dual	  track	  system	  of	  prices	  was	  introduced,	  as	  it	  had	  been	  earlier	  in	  agriculture,	  to	  create	  incentives	  for	  increased	  production.43	  	  Each	  production	  unit	  produced	  a	  fixed	  quota	  amount	  of	  coal	  at	  a	  state-­‐set	  price	  to	  be	  distributed	  by	  state	  channels	  to	  demand	  industries	  such	  as	  metallurgy,	  steel,	  and	  chemical	  production.44	  	  Above-­‐quota	  coal	  could	  either	  be	  sold	  back	  to	  the	  state	  at	  50	  percent	  higher	  prices	  (and	  eventually	  70	  percent	  higher	  prices)	  or	  on	  the	  emerging	  free	  (largely	  illegal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  China	  Economy	  Supervision	  Center	  (ed.)	  China’s	  Industrial	  Map:	  Energy	  (Beijing:	  Social	  Sciences	  
Academic	  Press,	  2006),	  p.203.	  
42	  See	  State	  Council	  Notice	  document	  no.	  86,	  April	  17,	  1986:	  ‘Provisional	  Regulation	  on	  the	  
Encouragement	  of	  Fundraising	  for	  Power	  Construction	  Investment	  and	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Multi-­‐Rate	  
Power	  Tariff’.	  
43	  Naughton,	  Growing	  Out	  of	  the	  Plan:	  Chinese	  Economic	  Reform,	  1978-­‐1993	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  
1995).	  
44	  Bin	  Wang,	  “An	  imbalanced	  development	  of	  coal	  and	  electricity	  industries	  in	  China,”	  Energy	  Policy	  35,	  
no.	  10	  (2007):	  4959-­‐4968.	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“black”)	  market.45	  	  	  Coal	  exchanges,	  that	  were	  established	  in	  five	  cities	  in	  1992	  to	  reduce	  the	  extortion	  occurring	  through	  middlemen,	  had	  little	  effect	  and	  the	  black	  market	  continued.	  	  By	  June	  1993	  the	  central	  government	  allowed	  central	  state-­‐owned	  mines	  (SCMs)	  to	  sell	  80	  percent	  of	  their	  coal	  production	  at	  market	  prices,	  and	  by	  1994	  decreed	  all	  coal	  freed	  from	  quota	  prices.46	  	  There	  was	  considerable	  backsliding,	  as	  many	  government	  officials	  had	  profited	  from	  arbitrage	  between	  market	  and	  state	  prices	  for	  coal.	  	  Also,	  thermal	  coal	  prices	  for	  power	  plants	  continued	  to	  be	  subsidized,	  yet	  Guizhou	  was	  technically	  the	  last	  province	  to	  abolish	  official	  state	  subsidized	  thermal	  coal	  pricing	  for	  power	  plants	  on	  July	  1,	  2006.47	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.	  China’s	  Historical	  Thermal	  Coal	  Spot	  Prices	  Converge	  with	  	  
Regional	  Benchmark	  
	  
Source:	  Newcastle	  data	  from	  Reuters.	  Qinhuangdao	  data	  from	  China	  Coal	  Transport	  and	  Distribution	  Association	  (CCTD),	  converted	  with	  daily	  exchange	  rate	  data	  from	  NY	  Fed	  and	  calorific	  value	  (QHD:	  5800	  kcal/kg,	  NWC:	  6700	  kcal/kg).	  	  This	  graph	  profited	  greatly	  from	  discussions	  with	  He	  Gang	  and	  others	  at	  PESD,	  Stanford	  University.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Thomson	  (1996),	  p.745.	  
46	  Ibid.	  
47	  For	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  this	  process,	  please	  see	  Elspeth	  Thomson,	  The	  Chinese	  Coal	  Industry:	  An	  





	   33	  
In	  addition	  to	  price	  liberalization,	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  allowed	  progressive	  marketization	  through	  the	  organization	  of	  annual	  bargaining	  conferences	  (termed	  “
订货会”)	  between	  the	  major	  mines,	  power	  plants	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Railways	  (MOR).	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  NDRC	  as	  an	  active	  player	  in	  these	  sessions	  has	  gradually	  declined,	  transforming	  instead	  to	  a	  mediator	  role.	  	  The	  state-­‐led	  conference	  was	  formally	  abolished	  in	  2004	  but	  the	  negotiation	  meeting	  continues	  in	  an	  evolved	  form	  named	  the	  Coal	  Production,	  Transportation	  and	  Demand	  Linking	  Session	  (“煤炭产运需衔接
会”),	  as	  all	  coal	  contracts	  still	  must	  be	  accompanied	  by	  signed	  documentation	  from	  the	  MOR	  indicating	  that	  sufficient	  rail	  capacity	  has	  been	  reserved	  to	  transport	  the	  coal	  under	  contract.48	  Thermal	  coal	  prices	  on	  the	  spot	  market	  rose	  25–30	  percent	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  by	  mid-­‐2004,	  while	  contract	  prices	  in	  China	  had	  increased	  by	  less	  than	  10	  percent.	  Due	  to	  this	  disparity,	  power	  plant	  managers	  interviewed	  all	  observed	  that	  since	  2003	  mines	  have	  continually	  renegotiated	  their	  prices	  and	  failed	  to	  deliver	  coal	  to	  the	  plant	  at	  the	  contract	  price.	  The	  domestic	  media	  has	  also	  reported	  openly	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  problem.49	  	  These	  liberalization	  policies	  eroded	  coal	  subsidies	  considerably	  and	  by	  2002	  the	  spot	  price	  of	  Qinhuangdao	  coal	  (QHD),	  China’s	  widely	  referenced	  thermal	  coal	  benchmark,	  had	  aligned	  closely	  with	  rising	  international	  prices.	  	  As	  Figure	  6	  illustrates,	  prices	  of	  Qinhuangdao	  coal	  in	  China	  and	  Newcastle	  coal	  in	  Australia	  tracked	  well	  through	  the	  most	  recent	  volatility	  caused	  by	  rapid	  demand	  shocks	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  In	  late	  2005	  the	  NDRC	  promulgated	  “Guanyu	  zuohao	  2006	  nian	  quanguo	  zhongdian	  meitan	  chanyunxu	  
xianjie	  gongzuo	  de	  tongzhi”,	  which	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  NDRC	  had	  abolished	  the	  “temporary	  interference”	  
of	  the	  central	  government	  in	  coal	  pricing	  for	  electricity	  generation	  and	  encouraged	  the	  signing	  of	  long-­‐
term	  contracts	  between	  coal	  and	  electricity	  firms.	  
49	  “Favorable	  coal	  prices	  to	  be	  abolished”	  China	  Daily,	  23	  July	  2004.	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Electric	  Power	  Industry	  
Processes	  of	  ownership	  and	  investment	  diversification	  have	  also	  penetrated	  upstream	  in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  industry,	  the	  result	  of	  far-­‐ranging	  reforms	  in	  electric	  power	  generation.50	  	  As	  occurred	  in	  the	  coal	  industry,	  the	  financial	  and	  administrative	  resources	  of	  the	  central	  government	  proved	  inadequate	  to	  meet	  power	  generation	  demand;	  a	  shortage	  that	  by	  the	  boom	  years	  of	  the	  early	  1980s	  became	  acute.	  	  Reforms	  pursued	  by	  the	  central	  government	  sought	  to:	  i)	  diversify	  sources	  of	  finance	  and	  augment	  state-­‐directed	  capital	  by	  allowing,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  non-­‐central	  government	  entities	  to	  invest	  in	  and	  build	  power	  plants;	  ii)	  raise	  electricity	  tariffs	  by	  abolishing	  command	  era	  pricing	  that	  only	  covered	  operating,	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  costs	  and	  introducing	  “cost-­‐plus”	  or	  “rate	  of	  return	  regulation”	  that	  accelerated	  capital	  repayment	  and	  guaranteed	  12-­‐15	  percent	  returns;	  and	  iii)	  levy	  a	  series	  of	  national	  fees	  to	  create	  specialized	  funds	  for	  capital	  investment.	  
A	  constellation	  of	  local	  and	  regional	  government	  actors	  that	  resulted	  from	  such	  reforms	  now	  extends	  deep	  into	  the	  power	  generation	  sector,	  including	  provincial	  government	  investment	  funds,	  local	  government	  SOEs,	  grid	  and	  grid-­‐subsidiary	  groups,	  and	  nuclear	  power	  firms.	  	  This	  complexity	  has	  been	  recently	  noted	  by	  a	  few	  studies.	  	  Chi	  Zhang	  and	  Thomas	  Heller	  observe	  that	  “During	  long	  periods	  of	  shortage,	  Chinese	  reforms	  focus	  on	  getting	  new	  power	  on	  line	  as	  quickly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  For	  an	  excellent	  updated	  review	  of	  reforms	  in	  China’s	  electricity	  sector	  see	  Chi	  Zhang	  and	  Thomas	  
Heller,	  “Reform	  of	  Chinese	  electric	  power	  market:	  economics	  and	  institutions,”	  in	  David	  Victor	  and	  
Thomas	  Heller	  (ed.),	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Power	  Sector	  Reform:	  The	  Experiences	  of	  Five	  Major	  
Developing	  Countries	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University,	  2007).	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as	  possible,	  and	  delegate	  much	  of	  the	  task	  of	  adding	  capacity	  to	  provincial	  and	  local	  authorities.”51	  	  In	  the	  six	  years	  since	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  State	  Power	  Corporation	  of	  China	  (SPCC)	  that	  once	  vertically	  integrated	  regional	  electric	  grids	  and	  electric	  power	  generation,	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  “Big	  Five”	  companies	  that	  were	  the	  generating	  assets	  of	  the	  SPCC	  command	  less	  than	  half	  of	  China’s	  electricity	  generation	  market.	  	  	  
Figure	  6.	  Ownership	  of	  Power	  Generation	  Installed	  Capacity,	  2013	  
	  
	  	   Source:	  China	  Electricity	  Council,	  2014.	  	   The	  energy	  corporation	  initially	  served	  as	  a	  vehicle	  to	  resolve	  increasingly	  blurred	  rights	  and	  claims	  between	  central	  and	  local	  control	  over	  energy	  assets	  during	  this	  untangling	  process,	  and	  also	  to	  attract	  foreign	  technology	  and	  financing	  to	  develop	  domestic	  resources	  under	  tight	  credit	  market	  conditions	  and	  poor	  fiscal	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capacity.	  	  Initial	  reforms	  were	  rather	  successful.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1975	  China	  suffered	  from	  a	  shortage	  of	  approximately	  5	  GW,	  or	  12	  percent	  of	  national	  generating	  capacity;	  this	  grew	  to	  15	  GW	  or	  16	  percent	  by	  1986.52	  	  Rapid	  increases	  in	  electricity	  capacity	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  to	  respond	  both	  to	  these	  historical	  shortages	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fast-­‐growing	  demand	  resulting	  from	  the	  expansionary	  economic	  reforms	  of	  the	  early	  1980s.	  	  By	  the	  late	  1980s	  annual	  capacity	  increases	  averaged	  a	  respectable	  15GW,	  through	  the	  boom	  of	  the	  1990s.	  	  
More	  specifically,	  formal	  financial	  reform	  of	  the	  electric	  power	  industry	  began	  in	  1984	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  legislation	  that	  transformed	  direct	  state	  funding	  of	  power	  plant	  construction	  into	  loans	  from	  state	  banks.53	  At	  that	  time,	  there	  was	  no	  foreign	  or	  non-­‐central	  state	  investment	  in	  China’s	  power	  industry.	  Price	  reform	  deepened	  in	  1986,	  and	  was	  highlighted	  by	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  ‘Provisional	  Regulations	  on	  Encouraging	  Fund	  Raising	  for	  Power	  Construction	  and	  Introducing	  Multi-­‐Rate	  Power	  Tariff’.54	  	  This	  battery	  of	  reforms	  increased	  wholesale	  prices	  and	  diversified	  sources	  of	  finance	  by	  permitting	  sub-­‐national	  government,	  private,	  and	  eventually	  foreign-­‐invested	  entities	  to	  invest,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  encourage	  investment	  through	  three	  main	  mechanisms.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  See	  State	  Council	  Notice	  “Speeding	  up	  the	  development	  of	  the	  electricity	  industry”,	  document	  no.	  114,	  
July	  25,	  1975;	  Chi	  Zhang	  and	  Thomas	  Heller,	  p.	  93.	  
53	  See	  Ministry	  of	  Electric	  Power	  Notice	  “Provisional	  measure	  transforming	  all	  budgetary	  infrastructure	  
fund	  allocations	  into	  loans”,	  document	  no.	  84,	  December	  27,	  1984.	  This	  was	  followed	  months	  later	  by	  the	  
MOEP	  Notice	  “Central	  government	  and	  State	  Council	  leaders’	  memo	  on	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  
utilization	  of	  foreign	  financing	  to	  speed	  the	  building	  of	  electric	  power”,	  document	  no.	  54,	  February	  26,	  
1985.	  
54	  See	  State	  Council	  Notice	  document	  no.	  86,	  April	  17,	  1986.	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To	  attract	  new	  investors,	  the	  reforms	  raised	  the	  wholesale	  tariffs	  paid	  to	  the	  power	  producers	  and	  introduced	  a	  pool	  purchase	  price	  (PPP)	  to	  a	  ‘cost	  plus’	  formula	  that	  guaranteed	  a	  12–15	  percent	  rate	  of	  return	  for	  newly	  invested	  plants.	  In	  addition,	  an	  RMB0.02	  fee	  was	  added	  to	  the	  end-­‐user	  retail	  prices	  nationwide	  to	  raise	  capital	  for	  the	  newly	  established	  electricity	  construction	  fund.	  Lastly,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  special	  fees	  and	  charges,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘fuel	  and	  transportation	  surcharge’,	  were	  also	  allowed	  by	  1986.	  	  These	  fees	  were	  collected	  by	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments	  to	  finance	  various	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Three	  Gorges	  dam	  project	  and	  the	  “coal	  for	  oil	  substitution”	  project	  and	  a	  portion	  was	  also	  disbursed	  to	  local	  projects.55	  	  Such	  reforms	  diversified	  ownership,	  diluting	  the	  central	  government’s	  share	  of	  generation	  assets,	  and	  also	  introduced	  sufficient	  sub-­‐national	  funding	  to	  increase	  generation	  capacity	  and	  largely	  solve	  the	  major	  power	  shortages	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s.56	  
Firms	  such	  as	  Huaneng	  Group	  proved	  effective	  at	  building	  partnerships	  with	  foreign	  financial	  institutions	  and	  creating	  the	  foundation	  for	  rapid	  expansion.	  The	  prominence	  of	  electricity	  firms	  in	  this	  crucial	  stage	  of	  policy	  and	  economic	  reform	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  six	  of	  the	  original	  22	  SOEs	  approved	  by	  the	  State	  Council	  to	  issue	  shares	  in	  overseas	  stock	  markets	  hailed	  from	  the	  electric	  power	  industry.57	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Zhang	  Chi,	  “Reform	  of	  Chinese	  electric	  power	  market:	  economics	  and	  institutions”,	  PESD	  draft	  paper,	  
Stanford	  University,	  January	  2003.	  p.9.	  
56	  Intermittent	  short-­‐term	  shortages	  always	  existed,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  most	  developing	  (and,	  occasionally	  
developed)	  nations.	  
57	  The	  six	  firms	  are	  Huaneng	  International	  Joint	  Stock	  Company,	  Shandong	  Huaneng	  Electricity	  Joint	  Stock	  
Company,	  Shandong	  International	  Power	  Development	  Company,	  China	  Harbin	  Power	  Plant	  Equipment	  
Group,	  Northeast	  Electric	  Transmission	  and	  Transformation	  Equipment	  Corp,	  Datang	  Power	  Company.	  
The	  listings	  occurred	  in	  1994.	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Huaneng	  Power	  International,	  Incorporated	  (HPI)	  was	  established	  in	  June	  1994	  and	  in	  October	  of	  the	  same	  year	  listed	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange,	  issuing	  $1.25	  billion	  in	  American	  Depositary	  Receipts.58	  By	  1995	  over	  40	  power	  investment	  companies	  had	  begun	  operation,	  forming	  what	  has	  been	  characterized	  by	  some	  scholars	  as	  ‘a	  group	  of	  independent	  power	  producers	  (IPPs)’.59	  	  In	  January	  1998,	  HPI	  was	  listed	  on	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Stock	  Exchange	  and	  in	  November	  2001	  the	  firm	  successfully	  issued	  A-­‐shares	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  By	  2002,	  13	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  investment	  in	  the	  Chinese	  power	  industry	  was	  foreign.60	  	  	  
By	  March	  1997,	  another	  power	  firm	  –	  Beijing	  Datang	  Power	  Generation	  Corporation	  –	  became	  the	  first	  Chinese	  firm	  to	  list	  in	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange.	  In	  December	  1996	  the	  State	  Power	  Corporation	  of	  China	  (SPCC)	  had	  been	  established	  and	  within	  a	  few	  months	  the	  MOEP	  had	  been	  transformed	  into	  the	  Department	  of	  Electric	  Power	  within	  the	  SETC,	  with	  a	  staff	  reduced	  to	  fewer	  than	  20	  people.	  This	  reorganization	  served	  to	  separate	  production,	  including	  both	  generation	  and	  distribution,	  from	  regulatory	  functions.	  In	  1999	  the	  China	  National	  Nuclear	  Corporation	  (CNNC),	  which	  managed	  the	  country’s	  nuclear	  power	  sector,	  was	  also	  split	  into	  two	  separate	  firms.	  One	  firm	  focused	  on	  resource	  extraction,	  nuclear	  processing	  for	  civilian	  and	  military	  use,	  waste	  treatment	  and	  safety,	  while	  the	  other	  remained	  responsible	  for	  the	  construction	  and	  execution	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Investor	  Communication	  company	  document,	  ‘In	  pursuit	  of	  world	  class	  corporate	  governance	  and	  IR’;	  
see	  <	  www.fa100index.com/images/PDF/huanengpower.pdf>.	  	  
59	  Xu,	  p.127.	  
60	  Woo,	  p.11.	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   The	  year	  1996	  resulted	  in	  a	  raft	  of	  new	  laws	  that	  brought	  legal,	  if	  not	  regulatory,	  clarity	  to	  the	  power	  industry.	  The	  Electricity	  Law	  was	  passed	  and	  allowed	  non-­‐state	  entities	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  generating	  sector,	  while	  also	  furthering	  the	  separation	  of	  regulatory	  and	  ownership	  functions	  of	  power	  producers.	  Between	  1998	  and	  2002	  subsequent	  legislation	  revised	  and	  clarified	  regulatory	  changes	  designed	  to	  separate	  generation	  and	  transmission	  assets	  formally,	  split	  generation	  and	  transmission	  pricing,	  launch	  small-­‐scale	  market	  power	  pooling	  trials	  and	  elaborate	  future	  reform	  objectives.61	  These	  objectives	  included	  (a)	  the	  formal	  separation	  of	  generation	  from	  transmission	  in	  terms	  of	  ownership	  and	  regulation;	  (b)	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  pricing	  mechanisms	  to	  internalize	  environmental	  costs	  more	  effectively;	  (c)	  the	  creation	  of	  competitive	  regional	  markets	  for	  the	  dispatching	  of	  generators;	  and	  (d)	  the	  development	  of	  market-­‐oriented	  pricing	  mechanisms	  throughout	  the	  power	  value	  chain,	  from	  generation	  to	  transmission,	  distribution,	  and	  retail	  pricing.62	  Cross-­‐subsidization	  through	  price	  discrimination	  still	  plagued	  the	  sector	  however.	  For	  example,	  in	  2002	  the	  average	  rural	  price	  for	  electricity	  was	  RMB0.66/kWh,	  compared	  to	  an	  urban	  average	  of	  RMB0.44/kWh.	  The	  largest	  differential	  between	  regions	  reached	  RMB0.264/kWh.63	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Prominent	  examples	  of	  such	  legislation	  were	  State	  Council	  Documents	  146,	  5	  and	  2704	  of	  2002;	  and	  
later	  2	  of	  2003	  and	  432	  of	  2005.	  
62	  Edward	  Steinfeld,	  “Energy	  Policy:	  Charting	  a	  Path	  for	  China’s	  Future”,	  World	  Bank	  China	  Note,	  June	  
2004.	  
63	  State	  Council	  Office	  of	  Economic	  Restructuring,	  ‘Zhongguo	  dianli	  jianguan	  jigou	  jianshe	  yanjiu	  baogao’,	  
November	  2004,	  p.	  150.	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The	  great	  expansion	  of	  power	  that	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  through	  the	  reforms	  discussed	  above	  also	  heralded	  the	  relative	  decline	  of	  central	  funding	  for	  such	  expansion.	  For	  example,	  between	  1980	  and	  1994,	  “the	  annual	  growth	  rates	  of	  both	  power	  generation	  and	  installed	  capacity	  averaged	  more	  than	  8	  percent,	  while	  between	  1980	  and	  1992,	  the	  share	  of	  central	  government	  investment	  in	  total	  power	  sector	  investment	  decreased	  from	  91	  percent	  to	  30	  percent”.64	  The	  central	  government	  provided	  nearly	  half	  of	  power	  industry	  investment	  during	  1985–90.	  In	  the	  following	  five	  years,	  however,	  between	  1991	  and	  1995,	  only	  one-­‐third	  of	  investment	  funds	  flowed	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  Financial	  levers	  of	  influence	  have	  clearly	  narrowed.	  In	  the	  same	  period,	  local	  sources	  accounted	  for	  42.9	  percent	  of	  the	  total.	  The	  third	  largest	  category	  of	  investment	  was	  foreign,	  equalling	  9.9	  percent.	  Moreover,	  the	  variation	  across	  regions	  was	  considerable,	  from	  provinces	  such	  as	  Tibet	  that	  were	  dominated	  by	  central	  state	  funds,	  at	  98.7	  percent,	  to	  powerhouse	  Guangdong	  market,	  in	  which	  only	  3.5	  percent	  of	  funding	  was	  from	  the	  central	  state.	  65	  Statistics	  for	  the	  Southern	  Grid	  reveal	  both	  the	  progressive	  efforts	  of	  local	  government	  to	  meet	  rising	  power	  demands	  and	  the	  necessary	  freedom	  from	  central	  guidance	  that	  the	  region	  enjoyed	  in	  order	  to	  succeed.	  Foreign	  investment	  shares	  were	  highest	  in	  Guangdong	  and	  Hainan	  (23.2	  percent	  and	  21.7	  percent	  respectively),	  as	  were	  local	  government	  investments	  (54.1	  percent	  and	  41.7	  percent).66	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Binsheng	  Li	  and	  James	  Dorian	  (1995)	  ‘Change	  in	  China’s	  Power	  Sector’,	  Energy	  Policy,	  23	  (7):	  619–626.	  
p.625.	  	  
65	  Xu,	  p.172.	  
66	  Ibid.,	  p.173.	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   In	  1998,	  after	  two	  years	  of	  operation,	  the	  SPCC	  had	  earned	  a	  mere	  RMB7.01	  billion	  in	  profits,	  based	  on	  sales	  revenue	  of	  RMB260.64	  billion.67	  	  Partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  such	  poor	  performance	  supporting	  the	  argument	  of	  reform-­‐minded	  leaders,	  in	  2003	  the	  firm,	  which	  controlled	  49.5	  percent	  of	  installed	  capacity,	  was	  broken	  up	  into	  five	  major	  generation	  firms	  (the	  “Big	  Five”).	  Additionally,	  6.47GW	  of	  installed	  capacity	  was	  allowed	  to	  remain	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  State	  Power	  Grid	  Company	  for	  eventual	  sale	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  finance	  power	  grid	  development,	  and	  9.2GW	  was	  assigned	  to	  a	  separate	  firm	  to	  cover	  non-­‐core	  business	  expenses.68	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   Understanding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  China’s	  energy	  governance	  enables	  a	  more	  nuanced	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  firm	  in	  the	  area	  of	  ODI	  and	  China’s	  rise	  as	  a	  global	  investor.	  Analysts	  who	  see	  a	  strong	  and	  authoritarian	  state	  supporting	  outward	  investments	  and	  those	  who	  see	  a	  liberalizing	  China	  with	  such	  investments	  led	  rather	  by	  increasingly	  powerful	  and	  independent	  companies	  are	  fueling	  false	  dichotomies.	  This	  paper’s	  tracing	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  China’s	  energy	  governance	  highlights	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  market-­‐led	  means	  have	  been	  be	  deployed	  to	  achieve	  state-­‐led	  ends.	  At	  the	  industry	  level,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  China’s	  coal	  and	  electric	  power	  generation	  industry	  data	  that	  in	  periods	  of	  high	  economic	  growth,	  market-­‐led	  policies	  of	  loosening	  prices	  and	  diversifying	  ownership	  can	  be	  pursued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Matthew	  Miller	  (2000)	  ‘Beijing’s	  power	  sector	  feels	  wind	  of	  change’,	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  13	  
January.	  p.10.	  
68	  Woo,	  p.9.	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by	  the	  state	  to	  achieve	  goals	  of	  “late	  development”,	  such	  as	  rapid	  capital	  agglomeration	  and	  industrialization,	  only	  to	  then	  be	  curtailed	  in	  periods	  of	  lower	  growth.	  	  	  
	   Second,	  the	  paper	  provides	  evidence	  that	  economic	  liberalization	  reform	  need	  not	  be	  incremental	  and	  is,	  in	  fact,	  reversible.	  Use	  of	  market-­‐based	  policies	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  state	  from	  reasserting	  traditional	  interventionist	  policies	  later	  in	  the	  development	  process	  to	  consolidate	  central	  state	  ownership,	  despite	  the	  creation	  of	  powerful	  firms	  and	  local	  state	  interests	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reform.	  	  China’s	  central	  state	  has	  proven	  quite	  successful	  in	  allowing	  periodic	  reductions	  in	  state	  ownership,	  pricing	  authority,	  and	  monopoly	  producer	  rights	  to	  ensure	  the	  growth	  of	  what	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  politically	  critical	  sector	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  It	  has	  also	  proven	  capable	  of	  reasserting	  its	  claims	  on	  assets	  when	  private,	  local	  state,	  and	  foreign	  sources	  of	  investment	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  no	  longer	  necessary	  to	  satisfy	  development	  objectives.	  	  It	  is	  during	  these	  periods	  that	  ideological	  concerns	  privileging	  central	  state	  ownership,	  always	  present,	  return	  to	  enjoy	  political	  currency.	  	  	  
	   The	  energy	  industry	  has	  experienced	  several	  periods	  of	  such	  central	  state	  reassertion.	  In	  the	  electric	  power	  generation	  industry,	  the	  electric	  power	  deficits	  of	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1990s	  resulted	  in	  the	  major	  overhaul	  of	  market	  access	  terms,	  project	  rate-­‐of-­‐return	  terms,	  tax	  incentives,	  depreciation	  rates,	  on-­‐grid	  price	  guarantees,	  approval	  procedures	  and	  other	  policies	  by	  the	  central	  state	  to	  attract	  systematically	  foreign	  investment	  and	  high	  efficiency	  power	  generation	  technology.	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As	  quickly	  as	  such	  investment	  ramped	  up,	  it	  collapsed	  when	  all	  such	  seemingly	  long-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐cycle	  policies	  were	  systematically	  revised	  to	  exclude	  foreign	  investment	  during	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  the	  resulting	  economic	  slowdown	  beginning	  in	  1997.	  	  
	   Such	  shifts	  towards	  industry	  structure	  consolidation	  and	  away	  from	  economic	  liberalization	  are	  equally	  clear	  in	  the	  study’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  coal	  industry.	  	  For	  example,	  during	  rapid	  rise	  of	  local	  and	  foreign	  investment	  in	  the	  electric	  power	  generation	  industry	  of	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1990s,	  described	  above,	  a	  similar	  diversification	  of	  financial	  sources	  was	  occurring	  in	  coal	  production	  capacity.	  	  Local	  non-­‐state	  coal	  production	  capacity	  rose	  from	  a	  third	  (36	  percent)	  of	  total	  production	  in	  1990,	  to	  one-­‐half	  (48	  percent)	  in	  1996.	  	  After	  the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  central	  state	  ownership	  consolidation,	  local	  production	  capacity	  dropped	  to	  a	  low	  of	  28	  percent	  in	  2000,	  despite	  the	  higher	  capital	  and	  labor	  efficiency	  of	  local	  mines.	  
	   In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  global	  economic	  downturn,	  China’s	  diversification	  reforms	  of	  the	  past,	  born	  during	  periods	  of	  high	  growth	  and	  energy	  shortage,	  are	  again	  being	  revisited	  and	  reversed.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  portfolio	  of	  ownership	  and	  investment	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  is	  being	  reassessed	  with	  the	  2010	  creation	  of	  the	  centralizing	  National	  Energy	  Commission	  mentioned	  above,	  and	  in	  other	  ‘back	  bone”	  sector	  such	  as	  the	  airlines,	  telecommunications,	  and	  transportation,	  central	  state	  ownership	  again	  appears	  to	  be	  consolidating.	  However,	  the	  strengthening	  of	  incumbent	  SOE	  firms	  through	  consolidation	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  highly	  problematic	  in	  meeting	  the	  pressing	  challenges	  of	  local	  pollution,	  global	  climate	  change,	  and	  the	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environmental	  and	  social	  challenges	  created	  abroad	  resulting	  from	  Chinese	  ODI.	  This	  will	  be	  particularly	  true	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  comprehensive	  reform	  in	  corporate	  governance,	  in	  regulatory	  independence,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  media	  and	  legal	  independence.	  Historically,	  Chinese	  firms	  and	  local	  governments	  pursuing	  their	  own	  economic	  interests	  served	  well,	  on	  the	  whole,	  the	  central	  state’s	  more	  basic	  goal	  of	  increasing	  national	  energy	  supply	  throughout	  the	  past	  three	  decades.	  	  These	  interests	  do	  not	  align	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  when	  the	  policy	  goal	  shifts	  to	  other	  objectives,	  such	  as	  the	  rapid	  reduction	  of	  energy	  intensity,	  energy	  demand,	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  national	  strategy	  to	  combat	  climate	  change,	  and	  the	  management	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  investments	  abroad.	  
	  
	  
	  
